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ABSTRACT 
The past few years have seen quite a bit of speculation over relevance 
theorists’ commitment to Fodorian semantics as a means to account for 
the notion of encoded lexical meaning that they put forth in their 
framework. In this paper, I take on the issue, arguing that this view of 
lexical semantics compromises Relevance Theory’s aim of psychological 
plausibility, since it effectively binds it with the ‘literal first’ hypothesis 
that has been deemed unrealistic from a psycholinguistic viewpoint. 
After discussing the incompatibility of Fodor’s philosophical account 
with the perspective that relevance theorists adopt, I briefly suggest 
ways in which further behavioural research on the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction could help advance more cognitively-
oriented accounts of encoded lexical meaning. 
Keywords: lexical pragmatics, Fodorian semantics, relevance theory, 
“literal-first” hypothesis, polysemy. 
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Introduction 
Ever since its inception in the seminal philosophical work of Paul Grice 
(1989), contemporary linguistic pragmatics has been typically viewed as an 
add-on to the more fundamental study of semantics, which deals with linguistic 
meaning in abstraction of its context of use. In this view, the recognition of 
speaker intentions, albeit instrumental for the recovery of ‘what is implicated’ 
by the utterance of a sentence, has been supposed to play little, if any role in 
the delineation of its semantic content, i.e. what Grice is customarily taken to 
have originally referred to as ‘what is said’ by it.  
This way of distinguishing between semantic content and pragmatic import 
may still reflect the received view in the work of most contemporary 
researchers who are interested in linguistic meaning, but it has been repeatedly 
attacked in the past few decades. On a number of occasions, various scholars1 
have pursued the argument that, even over and above the obvious context-
sensitivity of indexical expressions (such as I, you, here, now, etc), ‘what is 
said’ by a sentence cannot always be identified in isolation from the context of 
its utterance. Among them, relevance theorists have right from the beginning 
(at least as far back as Wilson & Sperber, 1981) insisted that the linguistically 
encoded meaning of an utterance, that is, its underlying sentence’s semantics, 
falls short of determining the proposition explicitly expressed by it, and that 
the hearer has to undertake processes of pragmatic inference in order to work 
this proposition out. The thorough investigation of this claim primarily by 
Robyn Carston in a number of publications, culminating in her Thoughts and 
Utterances (2002), has eventually led Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) to 
take up a radical version of it, according to which, “linguistically encoded 
meaning never fully determines the intended proposition expressed” (Carston 
2002, p. 49, emphasis in original).  
The espousal of this position, which has been dubbed the linguistic 
underdeterminacy thesis, has obviously placed RT in direct opposition to the 
traditional way of carving the semantics/pragmatics distinction at the 
propositional level. Quite predictably, this has in turn sparked the reaction of 
various philosophers of language, who have criticized this deviation from the 
long-established way of studying linguistic meaning, counter-proposing 
 
1 See, for example, Searle (1978), Travis (1981, 1997), Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995), Carston 
(1988, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2008), Atlas (1989, 2005), Recanati (1989, 2001, 2002, 2004, 
2010), Bach (1994a, 1994b, 1999), Levinson (2000), Jaszczolt (2005). 
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minimalist theories of semantic content that defend the context-independence 
of the proposition explicitly expressed by an utterance (e.g. Borg, 2004; 
Cappelen & Lepore, 2005). However, even minimalists themselves have at 
times recognized that “if communication can be shown to proceed without 
hearers processing the literal meaning of the sentence, i.e. without grasping 
minimal propositions, then the claim that minimal propositions have a unique 
role to play in actual communicative exchanges is undermined” (Borg, 2007, 
p. 353). In this respect, the linguistic underdeterminacy thesis seems to be 
vindicated by the existence of a quite substantial body of psycholinguistic 
research which has shown that the comprehension of figurative language does 
not necessarily involve the prior processing of the surface literal meaning (for 
representative overviews, see, Gibbs, 1994; Glucksberg, 2001).  
Moving from propositional to lexical meaning, it is this very psychological 
implausibility of the so-called ‘literal first’ hypothesis that has also motivated, 
as Deirdre Wilson herself notes (2011, p. 15), one of the latest developments 
within RT, that is, its account of ad hoc concept construction. Based on 
experimental research which has shown that our categorisation behaviour is 
highly context-dependent (e.g. Barsalou, 1987, 1992), relevance theorists 
have advanced the argument that the concept communicated through the use of 
some particular lexical item can be distinct from the concept it encodes, and 
thus requires a spontaneous process of pragmatic enrichment to be reached at 
during interpretation.  
Even though the experimental investigation of the particular proposals that 
relevance theorists have put forth with respect to lexical pragmatics is still very 
limited, I will attempt in this short paper to show that their theoretical 
proposals have far-reaching implications for the discussion of word meaning, 
to the extent that they could even challenge the current view of encoded lexical 
meaning within RT itself. To this end, I will start off with a brief overview of the 
framework’s assumptions that are relevant to the present discussion and will 
then move on to assess the account of lexical pragmatics put forth by relevance 
theorists and the tension it creates for traditional approaches to lexical 
semantics and, more specifically, the Fodorian one that relevance theorists 
have adopted right from the beginning. Wrapping up this paper, I will consider 
how the present argumentation can motivate new directions for behavioural 
research on the semantics/pragmatics interface. 
 
20  Humana.Mente – Issue 23 – December 2012 
 
1. Relevance-theoretic assumptions 
Right from its emergence, RT has aimed at providing a thoroughgoing 
cognitive account of utterance interpretation. For this reason, relevance 
theorists draw the semantics/pragmatics distinction in terms of the different 
kinds of mental processing they take each of these types of meaning to be the 
output of, instead of discussing them at a theoretically abstract level, as most 
philosophers have so far tended to. From their perspective, semantic content is 
provided via decoding, which is performed by an autonomous linguistic mental 
module, while pragmatically derived meanings are taken to be generated by an 
inferential processor, which is in turn dedicated to the comprehension of 
deliberately communicated stimuli and effectively integrates the output of 
decoding with readily available contextual assumptions in the interest of 
calculating a reasonable hypothesis about the original speaker-intended 
meaning. Without getting into too much detail, which is after all unnecessary 
for my current purposes, RT predicts that a hearer will automatically 
comprehend a deliberately communicated utterance by following a path of least 
effort, according to which, he will assess interpretive hypotheses in order of 
accessibility until his expectations for an interpretation that will uncover the 
speaker’s intended meaning are satisfied (or, in the case of miscommunication, 
abandoned). 
In the current setting, the crucial aspect of the RT account is that it does 
not take inference to work on the overall output of decoding during the 
comprehension of a single utterance, as a traditional Gricean approach would 
have it; rather, the two modules work simultaneously, with the decoding one 
feeding input to the inferential every step of the way during the processing of 
the linguistically encoded stimulus. Obviously, the replacement of Fregean-
style thoughts with subjective and context-dependent propositions – what 
relevance theorists call explicatures – makes it tempting to assume, as semantic 
minimalists have on occasion, that the framework encompasses some radically 
contextualist notion of semantics in its premises. On closer inspection, 
however, it turns out that this is not the case. As Daniel Wedgwood (2007) 
extensively discusses, the sole difference between the minimalist’s way of 
describing semantic content and the relevance-theoretic notion of ‘encoded 
meaning’ lies in the contention of the former that sentences do actually encode 
full propositions; other than that, encoded meaning is equally ‘properly’ 
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semantic, in the traditional sense, for relevance theorists too. Considering the 
following passage from Relevance, this conclusion seems to be warranted: 
By definition the semantic representation of a sentence, as assigned to it by a 
generative grammar, can take no account of such non-linguistic properties as, 
for example, the time and place of utterance, the identity of the speaker, the 
speaker’s intentions, and so on. The semantic representation of a sentence 
deals with a sort of common core of meaning shared by every utterance of it. 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995, p. 9)  
This identification of encoded meaning as essentially context-independent 
within RT also follows from the adherence of relevance theorists to Fodorian 
semantics. As Carston asserts (2002, p. 58), RT follows Fodor in assuming 
that ‘real’ semantics deals with the explication in truth-conditional terms of the 
relation between our mental representations and that which they represent, 
while linguistic semantics is merely ‘translational’, in the sense that public-
language forms inherit their meaning directly from the Mentalese forms they 
encode. Therefore, since in the resulting picture the only actual bearer of 
semantic content is Mentalese, which consists in concepts, and, as Jerry Fodor 
has it, a concept is an unanalysable, monolithic atom that is individuated by 
some property of the real-world entity to which it is nomologically locked, it 
becomes virtually impossible for encoded semantic contents to vary across 
different contexts.  
Therefore, even though relevance theorists maintain that sentences cannot 
be attributed any fully propositional semantics, they cannot but accept that 
lexical items2 do encode context-independent meanings; that is, the ones that 
they directly inherit from their associated atomic concepts.3 And this is indeed 
what they seem to have had in mind ever since they first entertained the idea 
that “words in a language can be used to convey not only the concepts they 
encode, but also indefinitely many other related concepts to which they might 
point in a given context” (Sperber & Wilson, 1998, p. 197), since, in the 
standard RT picture, in order for such ad hoc concepts to be constructed, the 
corresponding encoded concepts crucially need to be used as a starting point.  
In order to briefly illustrate the rationale behind the RT account of ad hoc 
concept construction now, let’s consider the following examples: 
 
2 Much like most relevant discussions, the present one deals exclusively with monomorphemic ‘open-
class’ lexical items, i.e. words that have some descriptive content (unlike indexicals, connectives and 
the like).  
3 For a recently presented, yet still speculative, alternative view, see Carston (2012).  
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(1) John has a temperature. 
(2) The fridge is empty. 
It should be pretty straightforward that in order to come up with the 
proposition explicitly expressed by the utterances (1) and (2) in certain, most 
likely familiar, contexts, the hearer would have to somehow adjust the encoded 
meaning of ‘temperature’ and ‘empty’. In (1), the word ‘temperature’ could be 
easily attributed the interpretation of ‘a high temperature’ rather than its actual 
denotational content provided by the concept TEMPERATURE, as this can be 
taken to be used in utterances like ‘Celcius is a scale for temperature 
measurement’. Similarly, in (2) the fridge might not be interpreted as being 
totally empty, but rather as being insufficiently filled with the goods that are 
needed by a household on a daily basis. In this case, the encoded concept 
EMPTY would again need to be adjusted so that the ‘not entirely empty, but 
insufficiently full’ interpretation can be yielded. 
According to the RT account, the construction of ad hoc concepts, like 
TEMPERATURE* and EMPTY* (to use their common notation), is the 
outcome of two pragmatic processes that can either individually or in unison 
contextually adjust the meaning that a lexical item’s encoded concept carries. 
The first one, which is dubbed narrowing, results in meanings that are typically 
more specific than the encoded ones, such as the one of TEMPERATURE* in 
(1), while the second, broadening, respectively generates looser word 
interpretations. Apart from general approximation cases, like the one of 
EMPTY* exemplified above, concept broadening is also assumed to mediate 
the interpretation of hyperboles and metaphors, as well as category extensions 
(e.g. when a brand name, like ‘typex’ is used as an umbrella term for all 
products with a common function), neologisms and word coinages.4 
As I have already noted in the previous section, the RT account of lexical 
pragmatics was originally motivated by Lawrence Barsalou’s behavioural 
research on conceptual categorisation, a point that in itself gives the account a 
quite high degree of psychological plausibility. However, it has often been 
noted5 that this plausibility is compromised when it is coupled with Fodor’s 
philosophical semantics, which relevance theorists have adopted for the 
 
4 For detailed overviews of the RT account of lexical pragmatics, see Carston (2002: chapter 5), 
Wilson (2004), Wilson & Carston (2007). 
5 See, for example, Vicente (2005), Burton-Roberts (2007), Groefsema (2007), Assimakopoulos 
(2008), Reboul (2008), Vicente & Martinez Manrique (2010). 
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purposes of describing what gets decoded and fed into the inferential 
processor during interpretation. As Anne Reboul puts it, “the notion of an ad 
hoc concept has rendered visible a long-standing tension in Relevance Theory, 
viz. that between the adoption of an (atomistic and externalist) view of concepts 
(such as Fodor’s) and the description that Relevance Theory effectively gives to 
concepts” (2008, p. 523). In the following section, I will turn to this tension 
and will attempt to show that the argument that relevance theorists have used 
against its existence runs into trouble when psychological considerations enter 
the picture.  
2. Ad hoc concepts and the literal-first hypothesis 
Based on descriptions similar to the one provided above, albeit much more 
detailed of course, Vicente (2005) and Groefsema (2007) have justifiably 
noted that the formation of communicated lexical meanings by means of 
broadening and narrowing suggests that encoded concepts must have some 
kind of internal structure, as it is only by way of manipulating such a structure 
that the construction of a speaker-intended ad hoc concept can be made 
possible. Naturally, if this is the case, encoded concepts cannot be conceived of 
as Fodorian atoms to begin with, since it is by definition impossible to either 
‘narrow down’ or ‘loosen up’ a non-decomposable atom. This criticism seems 
to be further motivated by the description of concepts within RT itself, 
according to which, logical, lexical and encyclopaedic information is standardly 
assumed to be stored in different entries of a conceptual address. Given the 
explicit recognition of such different types of information associated with a 
concept and their implementation in various discussions of ad hoc concept 
construction, like, for example, when Carston suggests that, in narrowing, an 
encyclopaedic property of a lexically encoded concept can be ‘elevated’ to a 
logical (or content-constitutive) status (2002, p. 339), it certainly becomes all 
the more tempting to assume that encoded concepts must have some more 
substantive content than a monolithic atom would normally allow for in order 
for ad hoc concepts to be constructed on their basis.  
The way in which RT addresses this criticism, however, can be easily 
located in Carston’s parallelism (2010a, pp. 174–175, fn.6) of the relevance-
theoretic notion of a conceptual address with what Fodor has recently called a 
‘mental file’:  
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When you are introduced to John […] you assign him a Mentalese name and 
you open a mental file, and the same Mentalese expression (M(John)) serves 
both as John’s Mentalese name and as the name of the file that contains your 
information about John; […] according to this story, we think in file names; 
tokens of file names serve both as the constituents of our thoughts and as the 
Mentalese expressions that we use to refer to things we think about. (Fodor, 
2008, pp. 94–95, emphasis in original)  
Taking into consideration Fodor’s description, it becomes clear that from 
the corresponding RT perspective, the various kinds of information that are 
thought to be associated with a concept do not form part of its semantic 
content per se, and thus play no role whatsoever in the decoding process as far 
as relevance theorists are concerned. Consequently, as a theoretical construct, 
an ad hoc concept would not appear to pose any particular problems for the 
way in which RT views semantics, as it is essentially the output of inference, 
with the input from decoding being solely the respective atomic concept (i.e. 
the Fodorian mental file name).  
This line of argument, which Carston (2010a, 2010b) has followed in 
response to a slightly different, but comparable critique that Vicente & 
Martínez Manrique (2010) have put forth, is certainly reasonable when it 
comes to the deflation of the argument that relevance theorists would be better 
off employing a decompositional picture of lexical semantics rather than 
Fodor’s atomistic account in their framework; yet, when the overall RT aim of 
developing a cognitively realistic account of communication is taken into 
consideration, it seems to be binding relevance theorists with a view that, as we 
have seen, they otherwise explicitly seek to distance themselves from, i.e. the 
‘literal-first’ hypothesis.  
Given the current RT account of ad hoc concept construction, according to 
which, the inferential enrichment of encoded concepts is standardly treated as 
an optional, top-down process, if decoding provides the inferential processor 
with the content of a word’s encoded concept, this content cannot but be the 
first interpretive hypothesis that the hearer will test for relevance during the 
comprehension procedure. Consider, for example, the meaning 
communicated by the word ‘temperature’ during the interpretation of ‘John 
has a temperature’ in the aforementioned context in which John has a fever. 
Here, according to the current RT view, the output of the decoding of 
‘temperature’ would be the concept TEMPERATURE, which carries the real, 
context-insensitive, and hence literal semantic content associated with the 
 On Encoded Lexical Meaning: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives 25 
 
word. For the inferential processor to construct the relevant ad hoc concept 
TEMPERATURE*, it will need to do so after testing the content of this 
encoded concept as a plausible hypothesis about the speaker-intended 
meaning, since, being by definition an unanalyzable atom, TEMPERATURE 
will necessarily be wholly employed in the process. But if the comprehension of 
figurative language is equivalent to that of literal meaning in processing terms, 
as the relevant experimental evidence suggests, the priority of this encoded 
meaning over the pragmatically enriched one is seriously compromised.6 Given 
the mechanics of the cognitive systems that RT posits, even Wilson’s recent 
suggestion that “the concept encoded by a word is activated during 
comprehension, but not necessarily deployed (2011, p. 16, emphasis in 
original) seems unsatisfactory, since again RT currently has no way of 
accounting for the activation of a concept without its initial incorporation in 
(and, if deemed unsatisfactory, potential discarding from) the mental 
representation that the inferential processor calculates as an utterance’s basic 
explicature. In general, if the encoded denotational content of any concept can 
be bypassed during comprehension, it follows that the inferential processor has 
some way of discarding ‘irrelevant’ lexical meanings before actually assessing 
them as intended interpretations. But since the inferential processor’s task is 
precisely to carry out this assessment in the first place, it has no way of knowing 
beforehand which encoded concept it will eventually keep intact and which it 
will need to enrich into an ad hoc concept.  
If this line of reasoning is on the right track, it reveals a challenge that RT 
would need to tackle in order to satisfy its overarching aim of psychological 
plausibility. And while the relevant literature has focused almost exclusively on 
the implications that the account of ad hoc concept construction carries for the 
discussion of a concept’s internal composition (or lack thereof), I believe that 
an equally important question that needs to be addressed is how well the 
philosophical discussion of lexical meaning that RT clings to can fit its 
 
6 A potential counter-argument that has been brought to my attention is that the experimental 
evidence against the literal-first hypothesis only carries implications for the discussion of 
propositional and not for that of lexical meaning. I think this is highly debatable since the metaphors 
used in the relevant literature often consist of a topic followed directly by the metaphor vehicle, as in 
the case of ‘Her surgeon was a butcher’ or ‘My job is a jail’. According to the current RT account of 
lexical pragmatics then, it is only the concepts BUTCHER and JAIL that would need to get enriched 
for the figurative interpretation to become available, which effectively means that metaphor 
interpretation pertains more to the discussion of communicated meaning at the lexical rather than the 
propositional level (in at least such cases).  
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psychological orientation. As I will now turn to argue the two perspectives are 
quite hard to reconcile, and for good reason. 
3. Philosophy and the psychology of encoded 
 lexical meaning (all too briefly) 
As we have already seen, much like Fodor, relevance theorists take on the 
commonplace assumption that semantic theory aims at providing an account of 
linguistic meaning at a level of abstraction from its actual use; ‘a sort of 
common core of meaning shared by every utterance of a sentence’. Given the 
RT on-line processing picture, however, it is only natural to expect that the 
inferential processor will have already enriched bits and pieces of an utterance 
by the time it has been fully heard in an actual communicative setting. In this 
respect, even though the decoding of this utterance will generate a 
concatenation of context-independent conceptual representations, by the time 
an utterance’s explicitly expressed meaning is constructed, it will inevitably 
present various degrees of deviation from the type proposition that Fodor’s 
semantic theory puts forth. Following this rationale, Carston recently observed 
that even if a sentence’s encoded meaning did somehow turn out to typically 
express a full proposition like the minimalist holds, the repercussions of this 
discovery would not be “a devastating blow for the central tenets of RT”, as 
“the propositions concerned would usually be very weak/general or absurdly 
strong, often either truisms or obvious falsehoods”, which would “almost never 
be the sort of contents that speakers want to communicate” (2010b, p. 268).  
Indeed, considering the particular cognitive processing that mediates the 
comprehension of linguistic stimuli against the traditional philosophical 
context of studying semantics, Carston’s remark appears to be on the right 
track, but from the very same psychological perspective, a pressing question 
also arises: if, without any contextual input, the thoughts that ‘there are cats’ or 
that ‘it’s raining’ that Fodor alludes to in his discussions are never ‘the sort of 
contents that speakers want to communicate’, is there any principled reason 
for which we need to accept that they are thoughts that we ever even entertain? 
And if the answer to this question is negative, as I think it is, what is the reason 
for which we need to maintain that these semantic contents are actual thoughts 
- rather than artificial examples pertaining to an abstract model of thought - to 
begin with? 
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Turning to lexical semantic content, this problem becomes even more 
obvious. As Carston herself discusses (2002, p. 360),  
Focusing on the word ‘happy’, let’s consider the concept that it is supposed to 
encode, a concept which is to provide communicative access to a wide range of 
other more specific concepts […]. The idea is that the lexically encoded 
concept HAPPY is distinct from all of these; it is more general and abstract than 
any of them, but provides the basis, in appropriate contexts, for processes of 
pragmatic enrichment so that addressees can come to grasp one of the more 
specific concepts and incorporate it into their representation of the speaker’s 
thought. But what is not at all clear is whether we ever actually have (hence 
sometimes try to communicate) thoughts in which this very general lexicalized 
concept features as a constituent, or indeed what the property of being HAPPY 
is, as opposed to being HAPPY* or HAPPY**, etc. 
Clearly, this worry is not exclusive to ‘happy’, but rather seems to present 
itself when the encoded meaning of any gradable adjective, where no absolute 
denotational property exists, or even that of commonly used verbs like ‘open’ 
or ‘stop’ are put into scrutiny.7 Even when we turn to nouns, the postulation by 
relevance theorists of ad hoc concepts in the mind, raises important questions 
regarding their implementation in the individual’s everyday thinking too. So, 
when the doctor thinks that John has a temperature in our familiar by now 
context, is she thinking that he has a TEMPERATURE or rather a 
TEMPERATURE*? Similarly, when Mary thinks that she wants to meet a 
bachelor, to use another well-worn example from the RT literature, does she 
implement in her mental processing the concept BACHELOR, whose 
denotation includes all male individuals who are not married, or the narrower 
concept BACHELOR*, whose denotation includes those male individuals who 
are not married, but who would also be eligible candidates for her to marry 
(obviously not the Pope or some very old or gay man)? If, as I take it, the 
answer to these questions points to the ad hoc rather than the encoded 
concept, it follows that these concepts coexist in our conceptual repertoire 
alongside their Fodorian realist counterparts TEMPERATURE and 
BACHELOR. And even if relevance theorists argue that “most occasional 
representations of a property (or an object, event or state) do not stabilise into 
a concept” (Sperber & Wilson, 1998, p. 198), they would still have to accept 
that at least some ad hoc meanings, which are very often used in everyday 
 
7 For the arguments here, see Sperber & Wilson (1998) and Carston (2012) respectively.  
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communication, like TEMPERATURE* and BACHELOR* (possibly also 
BACHELOR**, a stereotypical bachelor who is untidy, or even 
BACHELOR***, a man who seeks ephemeral relationships and so on and so 
forth), eventually get to be stored in the mental lexicon; and this time these 
seemingly ad hoc concepts would effectively be ‘semantic’, that is, decodable 
rather than inferred.  
This rampant encoded polysemy, as Vicente and Martínez Manrique 
(2010) have aptly called it, would be problematic from a philosophical 
viewpoint, as it effectively violates Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor. And 
although Carston has noted that such a proliferation of word senses in the 
lexicon would not necessarily be problematic for RT, since “within a theory of 
utterance interpretation conceived as a matter of on-line cognitive processes, it 
might well be more economical to retrieve a clutch of stored senses and choose 
among them, than to construct an interpretation out of a single sense and 
contextual information” (2002, p. 219, fn.50), when combined with the 
preceding discussion of the encoded meaning of words like ‘happy’ or ‘open’, 
this remark certainly raises questions regarding the relevance theorists’ need 
to postulate single, general concepts that encode the meaning of such words in 
the first place.  
Fodor has based his account of semantics on the presupposition that the 
content of a natural language sentence or a lexical item is entirely isomorphic 
to some determinate thought or atomic concept that they correspondingly 
encode. In this respect, apart from the few cases of homonymy, as in the two 
distinct meanings of the word ‘bank’, a lexical item carries a single meaning 
that is referentially derived. That is largely because of the issues that he has 
sought to address in the first place; issues for which context-sensitivity has 
traditionally been thought of as problematic, such as compositionality, the 
assignment of satisfaction conditions to semantically evaluable expressions, 
intentional explanation and so on and so forth. But this isomorphism does not 
work when psychological considerations enter the picture, a point that has 
been made by Sperber and Wilson themselves from at least as far back as 
(1998). When it comes to actual verbal communication, even Fodor agrees 
that “language is strikingly elliptical and inexplicit about the thoughts it 
expresses” (2001, p. 11), but this does not compromise his account, since it 
has little, if anything, to do with the actual processing of linguistic stimuli per 
se; it is “an account of the metaphysical character of the (primitive) semantic 
properties and relations” rather than “a specification of the semantic 
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properties of the expressions in a language” (Fodor, 2008, p. 18, fn.34). In 
fact, like most philosophers, Fodor has emphasized time and again that 
confusing psychology with semantics “is a very bad idea” and that “there is, as 
a matter of principle, no such thing as a psychological theory of meaning”, 
since semantics is by definition about “constitutive relations between 
representations and the world” (Fodor, 2008, p. 88, emphasis in original).  
Relevance theorists are in all likelihood equally aware of the more general 
dichotomy of interest between philosophers and psychologists who study 
linguistic meaning as they seem to acknowledge that “it is far from obvious that 
the label ‘concept’ refers to the same entity for both parties (and very clear that 
the term ‘semantic’ does not) so that little conciliatory progress is likely to be 
made until these differences are mapped out and resolved” (Carston, 2010a, p. 
175, fn.8). Even so, they choose to ignore semantics from their research 
agenda. For instance, in a recent paper, Carston indirectly responded to the 
criticisms that RT has been receiving regarding what minimalists perceive to be 
its semantic commitments by noting that discussions concerning semantics are 
not central to what the theory is all about and suggesting that the label ‘radical 
pragmaticism’ fits the theory’s orientation much better than ‘radical 
contextualism’. As she argues, “it is us, the users of language, who are sensitive 
to context, and, as rational communicating/interpreting agents, we are able, by 
exploiting this sensitivity in each other, to get linguistic expressions to do a lot 
more than simply express their standing linguistic meaning” (2010b, p. 266). 
In this way, Carston distinguishes the study of the cognitive processing that 
underlies linguistic communication from that of semantic content, or ‘standing 
linguistic meaning’ as she calls it. Since RT’s concern has always been to 
account for the ways in which the dedicated inferential process enriches and 
complements the semantic representation of linguistic strings, the argument 
goes, it should have nothing more to say about the nature of these 
representations other than that they are structured strings of Fodorian-style 
atomic concepts, which in turn need considerable contextual enrichment to 
reach full propositional status.  
As we have seen, however, the implementation of Fodorian-style concepts 
as actual processing units that lexical decoding feeds into the inferential 
processor during utterance interpretation appears to be creating problems in 
its own right; from a psychological perspective, RT’s inability to escape the 
literal-first hypothesis is a case in point, while from a philosophical one, the 
proliferation of word senses creates an uncontrollable system, where it 
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becomes very difficult to keep track of how many senses a word effectively 
encodes. Against this background, relevance theorists might need to explore 
alternative ways of accounting for encoded lexical meaning, since abstract 
philosophical models of lexical semantics of the type that Fodor offers do not 
fit the bill, nor are they supposed to. Therefore, a more psychologically-
oriented approach to the question of what an expression’s encoded linguistic 
meaning effectively is seems needed and, to this effect, behavioural research 
from the domain of psycholinguistics would undoubtedly have a pivotal role to 
play.  
4. Experimental prospects  
Given the detailed account of lexical pragmatics that relevance theorists have 
recently developed, it would certainly be interesting in its own right to see the 
extent to which the experimental research that has challenged the ‘literal first’ 
hypothesis with respect to the processing of figurative language could also be 
applied to the study of the processing of other types of pragmatically enriched 
lexical interpretations, like narrowings, approximations, category extensions, 
neologisms and word coinages. As Wilson and Carston note, some preliminary 
data on examples from the last two categories (Clark & Clark, 1979; Clark & 
Gerrig, 1983) suggest that they are “no harder to understand than regular 
uses” (2007, p. 237), but it remains to be seen how fast the interpretation of 
neologisms and word coinages takes place in comparison to the processing of 
literal meaning. Turning to cases of lexical narrowing, like the one presented 
in (1), and approximation, like the one in (2), I think it would be quite 
counterintuitive to expect any delays in their processing, but again there is, to 
my knowledge, a complete lack of experimental evidence to support this 
intuition.  
From the current discussion’s perspective, experimentation on different 
varieties of lexical meaning adjustment would be able to give us a clearer idea 
of how different types of enriched interpretations of a word relate to its literal 
meaning. If no significant difference is documented, this would strengthen not 
only the assumption that literal lexical meaning is in no way exceptional but 
also the need to come up with more psychologically-oriented accounts of the 
mental lexicon and more essentially its particular contribution during verbal 
communication. One of the few experimental studies on lexical pragmatics 
from an RT perspective that has surfaced in the recent years, for example, 
suggests that certain context-independent properties of a word’s meaning 
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remain activated even after a metaphorical (Rubio-Fernández, 2007) or 
narrower interpretation (Rubio-Fernández, 2008) have been reached. 
However, even though this set of experiments has been extensively quoted in 
the RT literature, no full explanation has been provided about what these 
properties are and how they relate to the equally context-independent atomic 
concept that the same word encodes. Foreseeing that a ‘core’ relevance 
theorist’s response would be that they are part of the information that is 
attached to the word’s conceptual address and thus not part of its content (as 
per the discussion of Fodorian mental files above), it still is curious why these 
particular properties are obligatorily activated during spontaneous 
interpretation, which in itself gives the impression that they are decoded rather 
than inferred. 
It goes without saying of course that the suggested behavioural research 
would not be without its limitations either. For instance, it can certainly be 
argued that it is dangerous to rely too much on time-reaction measurements, 
which most of the relevant experiments have implemented either way, since 
they cannot, on their own provide any direct evidence for the contention that 
we actually interpret literal and non-literal language by using the same types of 
mental processes.8 To this effect, using more advanced experimental 
techniques, and also potentially looking into what neurolinguistics would have 
to say could provide us with much more solid conclusions. Regardless of any 
such limitation, however, I am convinced that the tension between the 
philosophical analysis of lexical meaning and its psychological consideration 
that the RT discussion of ad hoc concept construction seems to have 
involuntarily revealed can open up new and exciting prospects not only for 
theoretical analysis, but also for experimental research on the 
semantics/pragmatics interface, at a time when the field seems to be dealing 




8 For a discussion along these lines from a psycholinguistic perspective, see McElree & Nordlie 
(1999), a paper suggested to me by John Tomlinson Jr. 
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